Jackson v Pacific International Lines: unsafe ship equipment, shared liability and damages

The Port Botany accident

Amie Jackson was employed by Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Ltd at its Port Botany container terminal. On the night of 22 August 2018, she was working as part of a lashing gang aboard the MV Kota Lambang, owned and operated by Pacific International Lines. Lashing bars used to secure containers were being stored in pairs of portable hooks suspended from the vessel's walkway rails.

The shipowner had acquired 30 new hooks about 12 days before the incident. The vessel arrived with the racks already partly filled. While Ms Jackson was in a narrow transverse walkway, a pair of laden hooks failed and several long steel lashing bars collapsed onto her lower body, pinning her against the opposite rail. The fractures and other serious injuries to her right leg, ankle and foot were not disputed.

The proceedings went further than the immediate fractures. The parties disputed why the hooks failed, whether the employer had its own responsibility for the condition of the work area, whether later neck, shoulder and psychiatric consequences were caused by the incident, and how the damages should be divided between an employer and a third-party shipowner.

Why the stowage hooks failed

The evidence compared the new hooks with the older ship equipment. The newer hooks had a wider opening, thinner material and less reinforcement. The shipowner's requisition had not specified the necessary strength of the steel, and there was no adequate evidence that the delivered hooks had been tested or checked as fit for their intended load. Another new hook failed the day after the accident, and the remaining hooks from the batch were removed from service.

Harrison AsJ accepted the liability experts' conclusion that the hooks were inadequately specified and manufactured for their function. The relevant risk was not simply that stevedoring can be dangerous. It was the foreseeable risk of serious physical injury when ship equipment intended to hold heavy lashing bars was not fit for purpose.

The Court rejected the suggestion that purchasing from a supplier was enough. The problem was not an undiscoverable defect in otherwise adequate equipment. The shipowner had commissioned replacement hooks without adequate specifications and had not taken reasonable steps to ensure that the new equipment was comparable to the robust hooks it replaced.

Why both defendants were liable

The shipowner controlled the specification and supply of the equipment and handed the vessel over with the hooks partly or mostly filled. Skilled stevedores were entitled to proceed on the basis that the ship's equipment was reasonably safe for its apparent capacity. The shipowner therefore bore the substantial share of responsibility.

Patrick did not order or install the hooks and could not have identified their inadequate construction by an ordinary visual inspection. Its separate breach arose from the pre-operation safety process. The Court found that the safety facilitator should have noticed that the hooks were full or nearly full, raised that condition with the shipowner and asked for the hooks to be emptied before the stevedoring work began.

The accident was not treated as an obvious risk

Both defendants alleged that Ms Jackson had failed to take reasonable care for her own safety. The shipowner also relied on the Civil Liability Act provisions concerning obvious risk. Those arguments failed.

The collapse occurred simultaneously and without warning. The walkway was only about 60 centimetres wide, and there was no practical basis for saying that a better lookout or greater distance would have prevented the injury. The visible presence of lashing bars did not make the hidden inability of the newly supplied hooks to carry their apparent load obvious to a reasonable stevedore.

The distinction matters. A workplace may involve recognised hazards, but that does not mean a worker accepts negligent equipment failure or automatically shares responsibility for an accident. The actual risk, what the worker knew, the available space and the feasibility of avoiding it all remain relevant.

Physical and psychiatric causation findings

The right ankle injury included a displaced posterior talus fracture and a distal tibial avulsion fracture. Ms Jackson underwent open reduction and internal fixation, spent 10 days in hospital and later returned to suitable duties for a period. The Court accepted continuing pain, stiffness, swelling and restricted function, together with a 50% probability of a future ankle or subtalar fusion in about 10 years.

The neck and shoulder allegations were more contested. Complaints were not documented until June 2020, and Ms Jackson had pre-existing cervical foraminal stenosis. The Court nevertheless accepted the ultimate expert evidence that unusual loading associated with treatment and crutch use produced shoulder bursitis and aggravated the previously asymptomatic cervical condition, leading to surgery in December 2022 and a further operation for infection. She had substantially recovered from those injuries, but remained unable to undertake heavy labour and faced a possible need for later cervical surgery.

The psychiatric evidence also required separation of a new diagnosis from an aggravation. The Court did not find that the incident created a new psychiatric condition. It found that Ms Jackson's pre-existing psychiatric conditions, including substance-dependency disorders, were significantly exacerbated by the physical injuries and pain, with an ongoing effect on work capacity. By contrast, the evidence did not persuasively establish that the claimed left-hand pins and needles were caused by the incident.

How the Court approached damages

The available heads of damage differed between the two defendants. Section 151G of the Workers Compensation Act 1987confined common-law damages against the employer to past loss of earnings and future loss of earning capacity. The third-party shipowner could be liable under the broader Civil Liability Act framework for non-economic loss and treatment expenses as well as economic loss, subject to the Court's 80/20 apportionment and the statutory calculations.

Non-economic loss was assessed at 55% of a most extreme case, producing a figure of $442,000. That was not the final amount payable by all defendants. Non-economic loss was available only against the shipowner, and the judgment required the parties to apply the liability allocation and other accounting before final orders were settled.

For treatment expenses, the Court accepted that the physical injury treatment costs had been reasonably incurred. It attributed 60% of past psychological and psychiatric treatment costs to the incident, allowed $80,000 for recurring future medical and pharmaceutical expenses, and directed the parties to calculate the discounted values of a 50% chance of ankle fusion and a 30% chance of further cervical surgery, each expected in about 10 years.

For earning capacity, the Court found that Ms Jackson could no longer work as a stevedore but retained capacity for lighter information, dispatch or reception work for the equivalent of three days a week. It used an average full-time stevedoring wage rather than the earnings of the best-performing comparator, assessed residual weekly earning capacity at $778.69 and a future weekly loss of $1,490.31. A 20% allowance for vicissitudes applied, and loss was not assessed beyond age 60 because the pre-existing cervical degeneration was likely to have prevented continued heavy stevedoring work by then.

Why there is no final payout figure in the judgment

The Court entered judgment for Ms Jackson against both defendants but did not state one final dollar total. The parties were given 14 days to calculate and agree the judgment amounts and the cross-claim consequences using the factual findings. Those calculations included past and future earnings, superannuation, treatment expenses, the future-surgery contingencies, the Fox v Wood component and the different legal exposure of each defendant.

Workers compensation payments also had to be brought into account. Section 151Z governs recovery where a work injury creates liability in a person other than the employer. It prevents double recovery and can require compensation previously paid to be repaid from damages. The existence of workers compensation payments therefore does not identify the amount the worker ultimately retains after a common-law judgment or settlement.

Practical evidence lessons from the case

• Preserve incident photographs, damaged equipment, procurement records, specifications, inspection documents and any contemporaneous investigation report.
• Identify which business supplied the equipment, controlled the work system, completed the pre-start check and could stop or alter the operation.
• Record the initial injuries precisely and maintain a chronology of treatment, mobility aids, changed movement and later symptoms.
• Ask medical experts to distinguish a new condition, an aggravation of a pre-existing condition and a temporary symptom, and to explain the mechanism for each conclusion.
• Keep workers compensation payment schedules, treatment-payment histories and wage records because they may affect damages accounting and repayment.
• Document attempted suitable duties, rehabilitation, job-search evidence and the real physical and psychological demands of any proposed alternative work.

What the decision does not establish

The case does not mean that every equipment failure produces the same allocation of liability, that every condition following crutch use is compensable, or that every worker with an ankle injury will receive the same damages. The findings depended on the hook specifications, the vessel and walkway, the employer's checklist, extensive expert evidence, the worker's pre-existing conditions and the particular earnings history.

It also should not be used as a section 66 permanent impairment calculator or as an estimate of work injury damages. A statutory lump sum, common-law claim against an employer and damages claim against a third party involve different thresholds, recoverable losses and procedures. The current legislation and the evidence in the individual matter must be reviewed before relying on any figure from this judgment.

Points to take from the decision

• The hook failure was traced to inadequate specification and manufacture; the shipowner had not taken reasonable steps to ensure the replacement equipment was fit for purpose.
• The employer was also negligent because its safety facilitator did not raise that the hooks were full or nearly full and request that they be emptied before work commenced.
• Responsibility was apportioned 80% to the shipowner and 20% to the employer. The worker was not contributorily negligent, and the collapse was not an obvious risk to her.
• The accepted consequences extended beyond the ankle fractures. The Court accepted a causal chain involving crutch use, cervical and shoulder injury, aggravation of pre-existing cervical pathology and significant exacerbation of pre-existing psychiatric conditions.
• The employer’s common-law exposure was confined by section 151G of the Workers Compensation Act, while broader heads of damage were considered against the third-party shipowner and adjusted for apportionment.
• The $442,000 non-economic loss assessment was one component of the Court’s findings, not the final judgment total. Economic loss, treatment expenses, statutory adjustments and cross-claims still had to be calculated.

Frequently asked questions

Decision and primary sources

• Full decision: Jackson v Pacific International Lines (Private) Limited (No.3) [2026] NSWSC 957
• Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), section 5B - foreseeable risk and reasonable precautions
• Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), section 5D - factual causation and scope of liability
• Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), section 151G - heads of damages available against an employer
• Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), section 151Z - recovery involving both an employer and a third party
• SafeWork NSW Managing Risks in Stevedoring Code of Practice - official industry risk-management guidance referred to in the judgment

Last legally reviewed: 15 August 2026.